Religious development:C.P. Tiele's paradigm of science of religion by Molendijk, Arie
  







IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2004
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Molendijk, A. (2004). Religious development: C.P. Tiele's paradigm of science of religion. Numen, 51(3),
321 - 351. https://doi.org/10.1163/1568527041945490
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the




C.P. TIELE’S PARADIGM OF  SCIENCE OF RELIGION1 
[Numen 51 (2004) 321-351] 
 
Arie L. Molendijk 
 
Briefly, the development of religion is the necessary consummation of all 
human development, and is at once demanded and promoted by it. (Tiele) 
 
The notion of ‘development’ pervaded the nineteenth-century study of religion. Max 
Müller lectured extensively on the ‘origin and growth of religion’,2 Edward B. Tylor 
undertook ‘researches into the development of mythology, philosophy, religion, 
language, art, and custom’, as the subtitle of Primitive Culture states,3 and Cornelis 
Petrus Tiele treated the ‘hypothesis of development’ in some detail. This paper will 
focus on Tiele and show how the idea of development functioned in his work, actually 
forming the foundation of his science of religion. No doubt other students of religion 
at the time were also deeply steeped in thinking in terms of religious development as 
well, but Tiele made an enormous effort to clarify the importance of the ‘hypothesis 
of development’ for the study of religion. Before turning to Tiele, however, I will 
make some general remarks on the use of the concept of religious development in the 
nineteenth century (I). Secondly, I will outline Tiele’s basic assumptions, paying 
special attention to his, at that time, famous article of 1874 on the laws of 
development (II). Thirdly, I will scrutinize the first series of the Gifford Lectures 
which epitomize his later views on religious development (III), and finally, I will 
draw some conclusions (IV).4 
  
 
                                                
1
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I. Some Remarks on ‘Development’ in Nineteenth-Century Thought 
 
Besides Tiele, the anthropologist Edward B. Tylor (1832-1917) was an extremely 
influential representative of evolutionist thinking in the nineteenth century. His line of 
research has been described as follows: 
 
Tylor’s central anthropological problem, in its simplest terms, was to ‘fill the 
gap between Brixham Cave and European Civilization without introducing the 
hand of God’ – that is, to show that human culture was, or might have been, 
the product of a natural evolutionary development.5 
 
The discovery of Brixham Cave had established the great antiquity of man and 
demonstrated that the biblical chronology was untenable. For Tylor, this meant that 
the investigation of human history had to be conducted along the lines of the ‘sciences 
of inorganic nature’: ‘[O]ur thoughts, wills, and actions accord with laws as definite 
as those which govern the motion of waves, the combination of acids and bases, and 
the growth of plants and animals’.6 Part of the debate concerned the question of what 
kind of ‘laws’ were involved in the process of the development of human culture. 
Friedrich Max Müller (1823-1900)7 was also involved in this enterprise. In a sentence 
which shows an almost boyish excitement in digging for the treasures of ancient 
times, Müller warned that his position was different from that of G.W.F. Hegel or 
Auguste Comte: 
 
There is to my mind no subject more absorbing than the tracing of the origin 
and first growth of human thought; – not theoretically, or in accordance with 
the Hegelian laws of thought, or the Comtian epochs; but historically, and like 
an Indian trapper, spying for every footprint, every layer, every broken blade 
that might tell and testify of the former presence of man in his early 
wanderings and searchings after light and truth’.8 
                                                
5
 George W. Stocking, ‘On the Limits of “Presentism” and “Historicism” in the Historiography of the 
Behavioral Sciences’ (1965), in Stocking, Race, Culture, and Evolution: Essays in the History of 
Anthropology, New York – London 1968, pp. 1-12, esp. p. 11; cf. Stocking, Victorian Anthropology, 
New York etc. 1987, 69-74. 
6
 Tylor, Primitive Culture, vol. I, p. 2. 
7
 Lourens P. van den Bosch, Friedrich Max Müller. A Life Devoted to the Humanities, Leiden 2001. 
8
 Max Müller, Chips from a German Workshop, vol. I: Essays on the Science of Religion, second 
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 This last formulation betrays the practical dimension of much evolutionary 
thought. Both Tiele and Müller hoped that the newly established science of religion 
would help to bring about a purer and more advanced form of religion. This ideal is 
often criticized by modern scholars, who want the science of religion to be a ‘fully 
secular, fully neutral discipline’.9 However, it should be borne in mind that most 
research at the time – also by those who were critical of Christianity – was not 
disinterested. Tylor, for one, claimed that ethnography was, in the end, ‘a reformer’s 
science’, which contributed to the ‘advancement of civilization’. It may be painful ‘to 
expose the remains of crude old culture which have passed into harmful superstition, 
and to mark these out for destruction’. Yet this work had to be done ‘for the good of 
mankind’.10 The doctrine of development involved a new, progressive view of history 
which differed fundamentally, for instance, from that of David Hume. The author of 
The Natural History of Religion (1757) thought that the chief use of history was to 
discover the ‘constant and universal principles of human nature’: ‘Mankind are so 
much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or 
strange in this particular’.11 The notion of progressive development (including new 
stages) has its roots in German Idealism – Nietzsche even declared it to be a typical 
German invention.12 According to this line of thought, the development of the human 
species was gradually disconnected from that of nature.13 In Britain, however, the idea 
that human history is part and parcel of natural history was not so readily given up, as 
is evident from the work of men like Herbert Spencer, Charles Darwin and Tylor. 
Despite these differences, in all cases scholars held the notion that species or stages of 
                                                                                                                                       
edition, London 1868, p. ix. 
9
 Jan G. Platvoet, ‘Hawk Says/Osansa se: Ade a Onyame aye nhina ye; an Observer’s View of the 
Development of the Study of Religion in South Africa’ (paper presented at ASRSA Congress, 
Swaziland, 28-30 June 1993), p. 13f.; quoted in Abdulkader I. Tayob, ‘Modern South Africa and the 
Science of Religion: Productive and Inhibitive Models for the Study of Religions’, in Gerard A. 
Wiegers & Jan G. Platvoet, eds. Modern Societies & the Science of Religions, Leiden etc. 2002, pp. 
302-328, here p. 322. 
10
 Tylor, Primitive Culture, vol. II, p. 453 (first edition, p. 410). 
11
 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, Repr. 1777 edition, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, third edition revised by P.H. Nidditch, Oxford 1975 
(etc.), VII.i.65 (p. 83).  
12
 Friedrich Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, Aph. 357 (Schlechta edition, vol. II, p. 226). 
13
 K. Weyland, ‘Entwicklung I’, in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (ed. J. Ritter), vol. II, 
Darmstadt 1972, col. 550-557. Here is not the place to sketch the history of the idea of development in 
European intellectual history, which would have to include French scholars as well. For the 
emancipation of the scholarly study of history from the philosophy of history in the nineteenth century, 
see Herbert Schnädelbach, Philosophy in Germany, 1831-1993, Cambridge 1984, pp. 33-65. 
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society develop out of earlier forms. 
 The variety of concepts and theories of development in the nineteenth century 
was immense and I will not attempt to present an overview, let alone give a synthesis. 
However, one term must be addressed and that is ‘evolutionism’. In this context it 
does not refer to Darwin and his followers, but to a theory of culture, which claims a 
unilinear, universal development from a ‘barbaric’ or ‘savage’ stage, to a ‘civilized’ 
form of human coexistence. In more developed civilizations, ‘survivals’14 from older 
stages may exist, but principally the course of history is progressive. One of the most 
famous schemes of evolution is given by Lewis Henry Morgan, who proposed the 
three stages of ‘savagery’, ‘barbarism’ and ‘civilisation’ in his classic study Ancient 
Society (1877).15 Evolutionism was a social theory with wide ramifications and, 
according to one’s point of view and interests, various representatives can be 
distinguished. In his stimulating book on the Victorian era, J.W. Burrow focuses on 
Sir Henry Main, Herbert Spencer and Tylor and also devotes some attention to 
theorists such as J.F. McLennan and Sir John Lubbock.16 In so doing, he does not 
deny the importance of continental scholars, such as Wilhelm Wundt, A. Bastian and 
A. Waitz. On the contrary, Burrow sees evolutionary theory in Victorian England as 
the outcome of a 
 
. . . tension between English positivistic attitudes to science on the one hand 
and, on the other, a more profound reading of history, coming to a large extent 
from German romanticism, which made the older form of positivist social 
theory . . . seem inadequate.17 
 
Evolutionism was dominant in early ethnology or, as it is now called, cultural 
anthropology. Tylor and James George Frazer are often mentioned as its main late 
                                                
14
 Tylor, Primitive Culture, vol. I, p. 16 (first edition, p. 15); cf. Kippenberg, ‘Survivals. Conceiving of 
Religious History in an Age of Development’, in Arie L. Molendijk & Peter Pels, eds. Religion in the 
Making. The Emergence of the Sciences of Religion, Leiden 1998, pp. 297-312. 
15
 Cf. Gerhard Schlatter, ‘Evolutionismus’, in Hubert Cancik, et al., eds. Handbuch 
religionswissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe, vol. II, Stuttgart, etc.: Kohlhammer, 1990, pp. 385-393; W. 
Rudolph, ‘Evolutionismus, kultureller’, in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (ed. J. Ritter), vol. 
II, Darmstadt 1972, col. 835-835; James Waller & Mary Edwardsen, ‘Evolutionism’, in Mircea Eliade, 
ed., The Encyclopedia of Religion, vol. V, New York 1986, pp. 214-218. 
16
 J.W. Burrow, Evolution and Society. A Study in Victorian Social Theory, Cambridge 1966, pp. xiii-
xiv; cf. Peter J. Bowler, Theories of Human Evolution. A Century of Debate, 1844-1944, Oxford 1986. 
17
 Burrow, Evolution, p. xv. Behind German romanticism lurks German idealism, which helped to 
establish a whole new paradigm of thinking in terms of historical development. 
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nineteenth-century representatives. Developmental schemata such as ‘magic, religion, 
science’ informed much research. Functionalistic anthropology gradually replaced the 
old evolutionism, stressing the fact that ‘magic’, ‘religion’ and ‘science’ could exist at 
the same time in one and the same culture, which ultimately had to be understood in 
its own context.18 
 Evolutionist schemes did not necessarily imply that religion was a superseded 
stage in human development, but could also be applied within the field of religion, to 
demonstrate, for instance, that ‘primitive’ forms of religion, such as animism and 
fetishism, developed through various sorts of polytheism to the highest stage of 
monotheism. This view was not uncontested. Tylor’s pupil Andrew Lang (1844-1912) 
defended the thesis that a kind of theistic pre-animism was the earliest stage of 
religious development.19 In an undated letter, Lang wrote: ‘To put it shortly . . . most 
of the very backward races have a very much better God than many races a good deal 
higher in civilisation’.20 This view – known by the German name Urmonotheismus – 
found its most adamant defender in the person of the devout Catholic scholar Wilhelm 
Schmidt (1868-1954).21 On the basis of this assumption, which accords better with the 
biblical narratives, a ‘degeneration’ must have taken place in a later phase of religious 
history. Most scholars at the time, however, did not accept the ‘degeneration 
hypothesis’, but had a more or less evolutionist view of religious history.22 
 By 1900, historians had pointed to ‘the ubiquity of evolution’ in religious 
studies.23 More often than not this was explained by reference to the influence of 
Charles Darwin. In 1909, Jane Harrison (1850-1929), the British specialist on ancient 
Greek religion, talked about ‘the creation by Darwinism of the scientific study of 
                                                
18
 Cf. Stocking, Victorian Anthropology, esp. pp. 314-329. 
19
 On pre-animism and its proponent R.R. Marrett, see Hans G. Kippenberg, Discovering Religious 
History in the Modern Age, Princeton – Oxford 2002, pp. 125-126. According to Marrett, Tylor’s 
concept of animism (‘belief in spiritual beings’) was too intellectual to capture the human sense of awe 
and power, which lies at the origin of religion. 
20
 Quoted in Eric Sharpe, Comparative Religion. A History, second edition, London 1986, p. 63. 
21
 The Dutch ethnologist J.J. Fahrenfort wrote his dissertation about this subject and became involved in a 
polemic with Schmidt; cf. Fahrenfort, Het hoogste wezen der primitieven. Studie over het 
'oermonotheïsme’ bij enkele der laagste volken, Groningen – Den Haag 1927; Wie der Urmonotheismus 
am Leben erhalten wird, Groningen – Den Haag 1930; on the controversy with Schmidt see A.J.F. 
Köbben, ‘J.J. Fahrenfort (1885-1975). Schoolmaster and Scholar’, in Han Vermeulen & Jean Kommers, 
eds. Tales from Academia. History of Anthropology in the Netherlands, 2 vols, Saarbrücken 2002, vol. I, 
pp. 245-265. 
22
 For Tiele’s rejection of the ‘degeneration hypothesis’, see Tiele, De plaats van de godsdiensten der 
natuurvolken in de godsdienstgeschiedenis (Inaugural address 1873), Amsterdam 1873, pp. 8-11. 
23
 Robert Ackerman, ‘J.G. Frazer and the Cambridge Ritualists and the ‘Scientific’ Study of Religion’, 
in Molendijk & Pels, eds. Religion in the Making, pp. 129-158, at p. 137; cf. Ackerman, J.G. Frazer. 
His Life and Work, Cambridge 1987. 
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religions’.24 The famous anthropologist R.R. Marrett (1866-1943) spoke in the same 
vein as Jane Harrison25 and, indeed, the notion of religious development was 
apparently the basis of much comparative research. In 1912, the British scholar 
Joseph Estlin Carpenter (1844-1927), lecturer on Comparative Religion at Manchester 
College (Oxford), wrote that the whole study of the history of religion was ‘firmly 
established’ on the basis of the ‘great idea’ of evolution.26 How influential this ‘great 
idea’ actually was within religious studies would be a fine topic for further research. 
One should, however, avoid referring simply to Darwin in this context, as recent 
scholarship has shown that Darwinism and the evolutionary theory of culture are 
clearly to be distinguished from each other.27 
 In his still much used history of comparative religion, Eric Sharpe does not 
entirely avoid this kind of misrepresentation, as he claims that the establishment of the 
field is due to the evolutionary method. He writes the following: 
 
Before 1859 the student of the religions of the world, although he might have 
ample motive for his study, and more than enough material on which to base 
his researches, had no self-evident method for dealing with that material; after 
1869, thanks to developments of the intervening decade, he had the 
evolutionary method.28 
 
In a footnote, he added that although challenged in the 1920s, the doctrine of 
evolution continued to dominate studies of religion throughout the period between the 
wars. These are strong claims, the more so since the alleged evolutionary method is 
not spelled out in great detail. The fact that there was ‘no further need for random and 
haphazard judgements’ is not much of an explanation in this regard. Moreover, by 
                                                
24
 Jane Harrison, ‘The Influence of Darwinism on the Study of Religion’, in A.C. Seward, ed., Darwin 
and Modern Science, Cambridge 1909, pp. 494-511, here p. 494 (quoted by Ackerman, ‘Frazer and the 
Cambridge Ritualists’, p. 137); cf. Mary Beard, The Invention of Jane Harrison, Cambridge, MA. 
2000; Annabel Robinson, The Life and Work of Jane Ellen Harrison, Oxford 2002. 
25
 Sharpe, Comparative Religion, p. 48. 
26
 J. Estlin Carpenter, Comparative Religion, London 1912, p. 33. 
27
 Stocking , Victorian Anthropology, p. 325, summarizes the differences between Darwin and 
Evolutionary Anthropology: ‘[I]t provided reassurance that human life on earth was not governed by 
randomly motivated Darwinian processes, but had an overall progressive direction’; Peter J. Bowler, 
The Invention of Progress. The Victorians and the Past, London 1989, pp. 68-69, 193-195, shows that 
many theorists of social and religious evolution did not accept the materialistic implications of 
Darwinism and built some sort of teleology into their own theories. They could claim, as did Max 
Müller, that they had been ‘evolutionist’ long before the Origin of Species appeared in 1859. 
28
 Sharpe, Comparative Religion, p. 27. 
 7 
means of a quotation, Sharpe suggests that one of the main goals is the search for 
regularities: ‘the Reign of Law invaded every field of thought’.29 The further 
characterization of the new method as ‘scientific, critical, historical and comparative’ 
does not explain why it should be termed ‘evolutionary’.30 Perhaps it is not so much a 
method that can be learned and practiced as a new way of looking at things. The claim 
for the importance of evolutionism in religious studies throughout the years between 
the wars should be critically examined. The Dutch evidence – as I will show in the 
final part of this paper – apparently does not corroborate this claim. 
 
 
II. Basic Assumptions 
 
During his entire career Cornelis Petrus Tiele (1830-1902) was preoccupied with the 
idea of religious development. One could say, with only slight exaggeration, that the 
development and refinement of this concept was his main concern. It was not just an 
important working tool, but the basic idea on which his science of religion was built. 
In his inaugural address of 1873, on the place of nature religions in the history of 
religion, he claimed that if the study of religion is to mature then it has to be 
conceived of as a developmental history (ontwikkelingsgeschiedenis).31 The relevance 
of nature religions depends primarily on their place in the general sequence of 
religious development. In his first monograph on the general history of religion, 
Outlines of the History of Religion to the Spread of the Universal Religions, Tiele 
maintained this principle. The explicit aim here was to outline a history of religion (in 
the singular) and not of religions: 
 
It is the same history, but considered from a different point of view. The first 
lies hidden in the last, but its object is to show how that great psychological 
phenomenon which we call religion has developed among the different races 
                                                
29
 Sharpe, Comparative Religion, p. 27 (referring to James Hope Moulton, Religions and Religion, 
London 1911, p. 7). 
30
 Sharpe, Comparative Religion, p. 31. 
31
 Tiele, De plaats van de godsdiensten der natuurvolken in de godsdienstgeschiedenis (Inaugural 
Address on the occasion of the acceptance of the professorship of the Remonstrant Brotherhood, 
Leiden, February 13, 1873), Amsterdam 1873, p. 7. I will use the word ‘development’ and its 
derivatives to translate the Dutch word ‘ontwikkeling’; the term ‘evolution’ is only used when the 
Dutch original has ‘evolutie’, which to Dutch ears is strongly linked with the notion of Darwinian 
evolution. 
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and peoples of the world. By it we see that all religions, even those of highly 
civilised nations, have grown up from the same simple germs, and by it, again, 
we learn the causes why these germs have in some cases attained such a rich 
and admirable development, and in others scarcely grew at all. 32 
 
In this way the essential unity of religion is presupposed, whereas differences can be 
explained by reference to various stages of development. 
 The germination metaphor suggests a biological model of development, which 
is conceived of as proceeding gradually. The same issue was already addressed in 
earlier texts, where Tiele focused on the problem of classification. A good example is 
his book The Religion of Zarathustra (1864), which, in the final chapter, aims to 
determine the place of Parsism in religious history. Contrary to Max Müller, Tiele did 
not want to categorize religions on the basis of linguistic evidence. He distinguished 
two types of classification: the genealogical type, which asks about the origin and 
mutual relationship between religions, and the morphological one, which looks at the 
nature and stage of development of a particular religion. Tiele was particularly 
interested in this last type, which made it possible to construe a scheme of the 
development of religion (in the singular). He claimed that the development of all 
religions is bound by the same fixed laws. There are four periods, which follow each 
other regularly and in the same order: the worship of nature, the mythological phase, 
the philosophical-dogmatic period, and, finally, the well-known triad of Buddhism, 
Christianity and ‘Mohammedanism’, ‘which we could call the universalistic or world 
religions’.33 This classification has a clear chronological dimension: no religion 
reaches the later phases without first passing through the earlier stages. We can be 
certain about this, because the most highly developed religions still show clear marks 
of having ascended gradually from the lowest stage.34 
 In the Outlines of the History of Religion, Tiele wanted to give scholars and 
lay people a general survey which could ‘serve as a kind of guide or travelling-book 
                                                
32
 Tiele, Geschiedenis van den godsdienst tot aan de heerschappij der Wereldgodsdiensten, Amsterdam 
1876, p. ix. The English translation appeared a year later: Tiele, Outlines of the History of Religion to the 
Spread of the Universal Religions, London 1877, p. x. It should be noted that the original Dutch title has 
‘wereldgodsdiensten’ (= ‘world religions’). An equivalent used by Tiele is ‘universalistische 
godsdiensten’, which is best translated as ‘universalistic religions’. 
33
 Tiele, De Godsdienst van Zarathustra van haar ontstaan in Baktrië tot den val van het Oud-Perzische 
Rijk, Haarlem 1864, p. 275. 
34
 Ibid., p. 271. 
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on their journey through the immense fairyland of human faith and hope’.35 The short 
introduction informs the reader about the basics of Tiele’s approach: 
 
The history of religion is not content with describing special religions 
(hierography), or with relating their vicissitudes and metamorphoses (the 
history of religions); its aim is to show how religion, considered generally as 
the relation between man and the superhuman powers in which he believes, 
has developed in the course of ages among different nations and races, and, 
through these, in humanity at large.36 
 
Religion is essentially a ‘universal human phenomenon’37 and its various stages can 
be traced through the course of history. This does not imply a unilinear development 
in the sense that all religions ‘were derived from one single prehistoric religion’. It is 
‘not improbable’ that different families of religions sprang from different origins. 
Tiele thought this to be an issue for further research. 
 What was of major importance for Tiele here is: 
 
that all changes and transformations in religions, whether they appear from a 
subjective point of view to indicate decay or progress, are the results of natural 
growth, and find in it their best explanation’.38 
 
Consequently, supernatural explanations were excluded in the science of religion. 
Tiele listed the various factors which influence the process of development: 
 
The history of religion shows how this development is determined by the 
character of nations and races, as well as by the influence of the circumstances 
surrounding them, and of special individuals, and it exhibits the established 
laws by which this development is controlled.39 
                                                
35
 Tiele, Outlines of the History of Religion (1877), p. viii (this remark is not in the Dutch original). 
36
 Ibid., p. 1f. (italics in the original). The Dutch original does not speak about race but about 
‘volkenfamiliën’ (‘families of peoples’). For a discussion of Tiele’s definition of religion see 
Molendijk, ‘Tiele on Religion’. 
37
 Tiele, Geschiedenis van den godsdienst (1876), p. 8 (my translation), Outlines of the History of 
Religion (1877), p. 6. 
38
 Tiele, Outlines of the History of Religion (1877), p. 2, Geschiedenis van den godsdienst (1876), p. 3. 
39
 Ibid., p. 2 ( I have slightly adapted the translation according to the Dutch original), Geschiedenis van 
den godsdienst (1876), p. 3. 
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On the one hand, Tiele allowed for ‘special individuals’ to influence the course of 
historical development, on the other, he wanted to establish ‘laws’ of religious 
development. The tension here cannot be overlooked.  
 A couple of years earlier, in 1874, Tiele had published a large article 
concerning this issue, which not only specified his view of religious development, but 
also the laws which governed it.40 The article is divided into four parts: 1) the course 
of development, 2) conditions of development (general laws), 3) special laws of 
development, and 4) the general law of development. The course of development is 
what Tiele elsewhere called ‘the morphology of religion’. What does the structural 
development of religion look like? Tiele described the course of development 
explicitly in terms of expansion, from family to tribal to national and, finally, to world 
religion.41 Parallel to this, the forms and contents of religious thinking and inclination 
(gezindheid) develop, which again influence religious practice. Sacrifice, for instance, 
is no longer a way of manipulating the gods, but a way to appease and to thank God 
(‘thy will be done’). In sum, religion becomes more rational, superior and pure.42 
 However, this is not a necessary development taking place as a matter of 
course. Certain conditions have to be fulfilled, and in this context, Tiele formulated 
two general laws of the development of religion. The first law says that the need for 
the development of religion occurs only in those cases where the advancement of 
‘general education’ (civilization) takes place first. This so-called Law of the Unity of 
the Human Mind (or Spirit) claims that the advancement of civilization precedes and 
encourages the advancement of religion. For the liberal Protestant Tiele, it is evident 
                                                
40
 Tiele, ‘Over de wetten der ontwikkeling van den godsdienst’, in Theologisch Tijdschrift 8 (1874) 
225-262 (signed: March 1874); shortened French translation: ‘Les lois du développement religieux’, in 
Revue politique et littéraire, deuxième série 11 (1876) 154-159 (‘D'après M.[onsieur] C.P. Tiele’, 
translated by C. Vincens). On another occasion I hope to devote some pages to Tiele’s discussions with 
the theologian Jacobus Isaac Doedes (1817-1897), professor at the conservative theological faculty of 
the University of Utrecht, and the Jena theologian Otto Pfleiderer (1839-1908), who would become one 
of the leading German scholars in religion and philosophy, after his appointment at the University of 
Berlin in 1875. Pfleiderer attacked Tiele’s concept of development as such, whereas Doedes cast doubt 
on the historical character of the morphological type of development and accused Tiele of making 
unwarranted assumptions; cf. J.I. Doedes, De toepassing van de ontwikkelingstheorie niet aantebevelen 
voor de Geschiedenis der Godsdiensten, Utrecht 1874; Tiele, ‘De ontwikkelingsgeschiedenis van den 
godsdienst en de hypotheze waarvan zij uitgaat’, in De Gids 38/2 (1874) 421-450; J.I. Doedes, ‘Over de 
ontwikkelingshypothese in verband met de geschiedenis der godsdiensten’, in Stemmen voor Waarheid 
en Vrede 11 (1874) 771-788; O. Pfleiderer, ‘Zur Frage nach Anfang und Entwicklung der Religion’, in 
Jahrbücher für Protestantische Theologie 1 (1875) 65-116. 
41
 Tiele, ‘Over de wetten’, p. 227. 
42
 Ibid., p. 234. 
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that man needs unity and harmony in his spiritual life, and that there is no conflict 
between religion and civilization; between faith and knowledge.43 This means, again, 
that education should not be considered to be detrimental to religion; on the contrary, 
it is a great aid to religious development. This whole idea of religious history as 
striving towards purification and developing into higher stages fits in all too well with 
contemporary liberal Protestantism, which located revelation not only in the Sacred 
Scriptures, but foremost in History itself. 
 Besides education, Tiele was greatly in favour of free trade and exchange 
between people and nations, as they can bring people into contact with higher 
civilizations and religions. This type of liberalism completely overlooks, of course, 
the power relations involved in the transfer of material and spiritual goods. Tiele 
represents a conservative and elitist form of liberalism, which was current at the time, 
and he probably had no doubt at all about the fact that we have to educate them, and 
they will be thankful to us for doing so. The history of Dutch religion and 
Protestantism in particular has proved men like Tiele wrong on this point. Orthodox 
Protestants did not want to be educated this way and were not thankful at all. At the 
end of the nineteenth century they even founded their own churches, which caused 
enormous trauma among leading Dutch protestants who were members of the Dutch 
Reformed Church or smaller liberal churches such as the Remonstrant Brotherhood to 
which Tiele belonged.44 
 The second law – the Law of Balance – also shows Tiele’s own preferences. 
According to this law, religious development is only possible if there is a good 
balance between authority and freedom. The ‘historically given’ must be taken as the 
‘starting point of the advancement’.45 A necessary condition of development is the 
existence of a tradition, which has to be carefully guarded by a class of priests, 
ministers or theologians. This does not mean, Tiele added, that there is no room for 
free-thinkers and the free preaching of the gospel. However, one should not 
underestimate the importance of an educated class of ministers and theologians, who 
protect us from falling into anarchy. Absolute democracy – Tiele explicitly denied the 
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‘unknowing mob’ the right to vote46 – is as dangerous for religious development as 
the absolute sovereignty of one leader or an oligarchy. A ‘real aristocracy’ – ‘the 
natural, lawful rule of the best people, regardless of rank and class’ – is the ideal for 
which Tiele strove.47 
 The special laws of development are the Law of Reformation, the Law of 
Survival and Revival, and the Law of Advancement by Reaction. Development was 
viewed by Tiele as a gradual, and primarily ‘natural,’ process. Artificial reformations, 
which do not tie in with existing traditions and forces, will not last. It makes no sense 
to change the outer forms. Instead, fruitful development has to begin with the 
improvement of religious consciousness. The second special law, which according to 
Tiele may be called Tylor’s law, explains that older ideas and customs may ‘survive’ 
in lower circles of society and may be revived at the moment when a higher stage of 
religion becomes weaker. Apparitions of the Virgin Mary, simple miracles and 
spiritist seances are examples given by Tiele. The third law formulates the notion that 
some developments are reactions against earlier, one-sided forms of religion. This 
does not mean that there was no grain of truth in the older forms. If one realizes this 
and does not consider one’s own position to be absolute, a true tolerance is possible, 
which values diversity as conducive to progress.48 
 The last section deals with the general law of development, which essentially 
maintains the thesis that the highest developed religion and therewith the principle of 
rationality and morality in religion always triumphs over lower forms of religion, 
even if the former is temporarily rejected in some special cases.49 The highest form of 
religion also maintains a balance between the ethical and the religious element. 
Christianity has not yet reached this final balance, but if it develops into the spiritual 
worship of God as the Father of all people, which reveals itself in the form of the 
compassionate love of fellow human beings, then at that time it will be, by forming 
the ‘foundation of true, complete humanity’, the religion of the whole of mankind.50 
With this, we have reached Tiele’s final verdict on the laws of religious development. 
 
 
                                                
46
 Ibid., p. 247. 
47
 Ibid., p. 248. 
48
 Ibid., p. 258f. Tiele referred here to Samuel Johnson, Oriental Religions and Their Relation to 
Universal Religion, 2 vols, London 1879, vol. I, p. 18f. 
49
 Ibid., p. 261. 
50
 Ibid., p. 262. 
 13 
III. Development and Classification (The Gifford Lectures) 
 
The importance of the idea of development for Tiele has already been recognized. In 
his obituary of Tiele, Pierre Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye (1848-1920) stated that 
it was the core idea of his entire science of religion.51 More recently, Tiele’s Gifford 
Lectures, Elements of the Science of Religion, were labelled the ‘clearest and most 
adamant post-Darwinian use and defence of the concept of development’.52 Indeed, 
the first part of the Gifford Lectures, the so called morphology of religion, can be 
considered as Tiele’s major discussion on the topic. Here, he dealt with the morphai 
(the ‘ever-changing’ elements of religion), whereas the second (‘ontological’) part of 
the Gifford Lectures investigated the ‘true being or essence of religion’.53 In the 
eighth lecture of the first series Tiele briefly looked back on his earlier work, 
especially on the article about the laws of development of 1874, which was discussed 
above. 
 
Much of what I then wrote I should now formulate otherwise, and I have 
indeed several times modified my university lectures on the subject 
accordingly. And I must now admit that the title of the article was not quite 
accurate. I should not have said ‘Laws of the Development of Religion’, but 
‘Laws of Development in their Application to Religion’. For in point of fact I 
only meant even then to maintain that the laws which govern the development 
of the human mind hold true of religion also, though their application may 
differ in form and in details. But I still adhere to the article as a whole, and 
have not altered my opinion in point of principle. If such laws – or call them 
the rules, forms, necessary conditions, if you will, by which spiritual 
development is bound – did not exist, and if we were unable to form some idea 
of them corresponding with reality, it would be better to give up the science of 
religion altogether as a fond illusion. We should not even be entitled to speak 
                                                
51
 P.D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, ‘Cornelis Petrus Tiele’, in Jaarboek van de Koninklijke Akademie van 
Wetenschappen (1902) 125-154; reprinted in id., Portretten en Kritieken, Haarlem 1909, pp. 82-120, at p. 
116. 
52
 Tim Murphy, ‘The Concept “Entwicklung” in German Religionswissenschaft: Before and After 
Darwin’, in Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 11 (1999) 8-23, p. 15. Without any noticeable 
hesitation Murphy includes the Dutchman Tiele in the ‘German schools of Religionswissenschaft’, 
which employ an ‘inherently anti-empiricist and anti-materialist’ concept of development. 
53
 Tiele, Elements of the Science of Religion, 2 vols, Edinburgh – London, 1897-1899, vol. II, p. 188. 
Comment [JCH3]: For? 
 14 
of development at all, for this idea necessarily involves that of rules and 
laws.54 
 
This quotation indicates both how important and, at the same time, how difficult the 
concepts of development and laws are. 
 In the following I will highlight how the idea of development functions in the 
first series of the Gifford Lectures. In my analysis I will also make use of the 
influential article ‘Religions’, which Tiele wrote for the ninth edition of the 
Encyclopedia Britannica (1886), and the short manual of his philosophy of religion 
Outlines of the Science of Religion (1901), which presents the views, so eloquently 
stated in the Gifford Lectures, in a much briefer compass.55 Firstly, I will consider the 
actual concept of religious development in more depth (a); secondly, the basic 
dichotomy between nature and ethical religions will be discussed (b); and finally, 
Tiele’s idea of the laws of development will be addressed (c). 
 (a) According to Tiele, the metaphor of development is borrowed from natural 
history, and is only applied by analogy to the spiritual life of man. 
 
Development is growth. From the green bud the flower bursts forth as from its 
sheath, and reveals the wealth and brilliance of its colours. From the tiny acorn 
springs up the mighty oak in all its majesty.56 
 
The examples given all point to organic growth: things develop out of germs that 
potentially contain the later phases of development. If one destroys one thing and puts 
another in its place, this is not called development. Tiele mentioned two implications, 
firstly, that the object undergoing development is a unity, and, secondly: 
 
. . . that each phase of the evolution has its value, importance, and right of 
existence, and that it is necessary to give birth to a higher phase, and continues 
to act in that higher phase.57 
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Instead of giving his own definition, Tiele quoted ‘an American scholar’, who 
characterized development as follows: ‘a continuous progressive change according to 
certain laws and by means of resident forces’.58 One would like to have had a 
somewhat more precise definition. 
 Instead, Tiele specified the type of history he had in mind, which is expounded 
in such statements as religions die, but religion itself does not. Ultimately, he was not 
interested in local or temporal religious developments but in the development of 
religion in mankind. ‘Its development may be described as the evolution of the 
religious idea in history, or better as the progress of the religious man, or of mankind 
as religious by nature’.59 As the core of religion, according to Tiele, lies in the inner 
disposition towards God, outer forms change due to inner change. In several senses of 
the word this is an ‘idealist’ view of religious development. In all the changes and 
vicissitudes, Tiele discerned:  
 
. . . not a puzzling, but a grand and instructive spectacle – the labour of the 
human spirit to find fitter and fuller expression for the religious idea as it 
becomes ever clearer, and for religious needs as they become ever loftier – not 
the mere fickle play of human caprice, but, to use the language of faith, the 
eternal working of the divine Spirit.60 
 
In this way, the history of religion is given a teleological perspective, which accords 
perfectly with Tiele’s liberal Protestantism. 
 (b) After this exposition of the concept of development, Tiele treated the 
stages of development. Three lectures, discussing the ‘lowest nature-religions’, the 
‘highest nature-religions’ and the ‘ethical religions’ successively, are concerned with 
this subject. I will not summarize these chapters, but highlight the basic dichotomy 
between nature and ethical religions which underlies Tiele’s treatment. Firstly, 
however, it has to be stressed again that in this view historical research involves a 
classification of religions. Thus, Tiele spent much time finding an adequate 
categorization. He started by pointing to the fact that the old classifications by 
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scholars such as Hegel are no longer of any use, because they were based on 
insufficient data.61 In his contribution to the Encyclopedia Britannica, Tiele gave Max 
Müller some credit, but criticized Müller’s view that the classification of religions 
runs parallel to that of languages: ‘[T]he farther history advances the more does 
religion become independent of both language and nationality’.62 
 Although the difference between nature and ethical religions is one of 
principle, the transition from the former to the latter cannot be described in terms of a 
rift. However, it is not a smooth, uncomplicated development either. On the one hand, 
the element of continuity is emphasized: for instance, ethical attributes can also be 
ascribed to the gods at the level of nature religions, but in these cases the ‘ethical 
personifications are simply incorporated in the old system, and not only not 
distinguished from the nature gods, but even subordinated to them’.63 On the other 
hand, the transition from the higher nature religions to ethical forms of religions 
apparently implies a discontinuity: it ‘is invariably accomplished by means of a 
designated reformation, or sometimes even by a revolution’.64 The opposition is 
described in various ways. Whereas nature religions tend to polytheism, ethical 
religions tend to monotheism. Ethical religions do not depend on the common belief 
in national traditions but on the belief in a doctrine of salvation, and are founded by 
individuals or in some cases by a body of priests or teachers. The opposition is 
sketched by Tiele in a multifaceted way, which I have only roughly outlined here. He 
did not stop at this point but discussed the various ‘subdivisions of each of the two 
principal categories’ in some detail.65 
 I will not go into the various ramifications and stages within the history of 
nature religions, but turn to Tiele’s discussion of ethical religions. He started with a 
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question which had already been raised by Abraham Kuenen in his Hibbert 
Lectures:66  
 
What right have we to divide them into nomistic or nomothetic communities, 
founded on a law or Holy Scripture, and universal or world religions, which 
start from principles and maxims, the latter being only three – Buddhism, 
Christianity, and Mohammedanism?67  
 
Although the category ‘world religions’ may have some practical use (‘to distinguish 
the three religions which have found their way to different races and peoples and all 
of which profess the intention to conquer the world’), Tiele preferred to drop the term, 
which he had used himself many times in his earlier work.68 This is not to say that 
there is no difference between these three religions, on the one hand, and 
‘Confucianism, Brahmanism, Jainism, Mazdaism, and Judaism on the other’.69 Tiele 
made an attempt to distinguish the two categories as follows: particularistic versus 
universalistic (not universal); national versus human; and those bound to special 
doctrines and rites, versus others which, although equally embodied in doctrines and 
rites, are ‘nevertheless really free from them’, as they start from principles and 
maxims.70 
 This does not mean that the three universalistic religious communities are on 
the same level: ‘Both Islam and Buddhism, if not national, are only relatively 
universalistic, and show the one-sidedness, the one of the Semitic, the other of Aryan 
race’.71 Whereas Islam exalts the divine and opposes it to the human, Buddhism 
neglects the divine and preaches salvation through self-renunciation. Moreover, 
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Buddhism is atheistic in its origin and becomes easily infested by the ‘most childish 
superstitions’. Evidently, Islam is worse than Buddhism – because of its ritualistic 
features it ‘is little better than an extended Judaism’. Buddhism comes close to 
Christianity because its worship is not ‘necessarily bound to place or time’. However, 
because of its capacity to adapt itself to ever new circumstances, ‘which is the natural 
result of its purely spiritual character, Christianity ranks incommensurably high above 
both its rivals’.72 Tiele added a footnote to stress that this statement is not a confession 
but is made from a scientific point of view. In the Gifford Lectures he argued that 
these religions were called ‘ethical’:  
 
. . . because, arising out of an ethical awakening, they aim at a more or less 
lofty ethical ideal, an ideal no longer merely co-ordinated with religion, but 
conceived as God’s own will, and an emanation of His being – or in more 
abstract philosophical language, an ideal objectivised in, and projected into the 
conception of God.73 
 
Whereas Tiele subscribed wholeheartedly to the differentiation thesis (in the course of 
history religion becomes a more and more autonomous phenomenon), this did not 
imply that religion and the ethical element were to be separated from each other. The 
universalistic tendency of the ‘ethical religions’ implied an inclusiveness: all fellow 
human beings were to be included in the ultimate religion, which should evolve out of 
– liberal Protestant – Christianity. 
 (c) In the first series of the Gifford Lectures, Tiele readjusted his views 
concerning the laws of religious development. Firstly, he rejected the idea of special 
laws of religious development; secondly, he clearly distinguished the (general) ‘laws 
which govern the development of the human mind’ from the laws of natural science,74 
and, thirdly, he clarified which ‘laws’ were actually basic to religious development. It 
remains difficult to specify exactly Tiele’s view in this matter, as we find different 
laws of development in his last book Outlines of the Science of Religion, which 
appeared only a couple of years after the Gifford Lectures. To a large extent, the 
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difference can be seen as a difference of expression, stating more or less the same 
insights, but nevertheless, it was apparently not easy for Tiele to settle the whole issue 
in an unambiguous way. 
 In the eighth chapter of the Gifford Lectures, Tiele formulated two laws: (1) 
the Law of the Unity of the Human Mind (essentially the same law as stated in his 
article of 1874 discussed above)75, and (2) the Law of Intellectual Intercourse, which 
runs as follows: 
 
All development, apart from the natural capabilities of men and peoples, 
results from the stimulus given to self-consciousness by contact with a 
different stage of development, whether higher or lower.76 
 
If we apply this general law to religion, two ‘practical rules’ follow from it: (1) ‘The 
religion that will attain the highest development is that which is most alive to the 
genuinely religious elements in other forms’, and (2) ‘Religious development is best 
promoted by the free intercourse of its most diverse manifestations’.77 This conforms 
perfectly, of course, to the idea of growth by assimilation, both in cultural and 
religious ways: ‘religion assimilates whatever is good and true in general culture; and 
each form of religion assimilates whatever is true and good in other forms’.78 The first 
law finds its foundation in the unity of the human mind, the second in the unity of the 
human species. Both laws can be seen as expressions of the ‘great Law of 
Assimilation’, which is the most important factor of development.79 
 The ninth chapter of the Gifford Lectures addresses the issue of the ‘influence 
of the individual in the development of religion’.80 This influence should not be 
underrated in Tiele’s view, as ‘all progress, reform, discovery, invention, must have 
originated in the brain of a single individual’.81 ‘Religion develops through the 
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medium of persons’.82 Because so much depends on the creativity of individuals, 
there is an element which cannot be explained in (religious) development.83 
Interestingly enough, in this chapter which focuses on the role of the individual, and 
thus points to the inexplicable element in history, Tiele also elaborated on the 
continuity of human history in general and religious history in particular, which leads 
to the formulation of the ‘great law of the continuity of religious development’.84 
Whether or not this is actually a law in any precise sense of the word, it is 
fundamental for Tiele’s understanding of development. Even in periods of apparent 
decay, ‘there arise mighty spirits from whom emanates a new revelation of religious 
life, a higher than the preceding, yet rooted in it’.85 Development must not be seen as 
the ‘supersession of the old by something new, something different’, but as ‘growth 
from a germ, in which lies latent everything that later springs from it’.86 
 Besides the laws of the unity of the human mind, of human intercourse, and of 
progressive development, in his Outlines (1901) Tiele also listed the Law of Balance 
or Synthesis, which we already encountered in the article of 1874. Applied to religion, 
it means that there has to be a balance between authority and tradition, on the one 
hand, and freedom of individual consciousness, on the other.87 In the Gifford Lectures 
Tiele was less outspoken. He more or less rejected the law of self-recovery by 
reaction, stressed the need for an equilibrium between various directions of 
development,88 and concluded by saying: ‘If . . . there be any such law at all, we 
prefer to call it the law of progress by synthesis or reconciliation. But we shall see 
afterwards that it is only one phase, a single manifestation, of the main law that 
governs all development, including that of religion’.89 
 This main law is addressed in the tenth and last chapter of the first series of the 
Gifford Lectures about the essentials of the development of religion. Ultimately it is a 
twofold process: ‘ever-increasing differentiation, coupled with efforts for 
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reconciliation and unity’.90 I will give a somewhat longer quotation to show how Tiele 
saw this as an interrelated process: 
 
From an originally somewhat motley and chaotic, yet monotonous, 
multiplicity of forms, several more developed groups gradually detach 
themselves, formed by the confluence of a number of hitherto distinct modes 
of worship. This is the genesis of a certain unification, and the beginning of 
differentiation at the same time, because new and more pronounced varieties 
constantly arise. And so the process goes on: union and partition, the 
formation of great unities which again break up into new varieties, until new 
combinations are again effected. Yet the general tendency of religious 
development indicates ever-diminishing particularism, ever-increasing 
universalism, and an aspiration, whether conscious or not, for true 
catholicity.91 
 
The dialectic between differentiation and unification is to be read within a teleological 
framework. The articulation of different forms does not preclude a tendency to 
unification and simplification, as it is also called, by which Tiele meant that religions 
are ‘reduced to a fixed system, to a few cardinal points, and at last to a single 
fundamental principle’.92 
 Tiele pointed to a similar dialectic regarding the relationship between religions 
and other cultural domains. On the one hand, religion 
 
 . . . conquers a province of its own, and in that province attains ever greater 
independence . . . but not in the sense of being indifferent to the influence of 
advancing civilisation and the development of art, science, morality, and 
society.93 
 
According to the law of the unity of the human mind, the ever-growing independence 
of the religious sphere does not preclude efforts ‘to reconcile religion with the 
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interests of science and art, of philosophy and morality, of society and the State’.94 
Ultimately, the development of religion was related by Tiele to a progress of self-
consciousness. Man ‘becomes ever more clearly conscious of what he is and what he 
requires as a religious being, and of the nature and the demands of the religion within 
him’.95 The engine, so to speak, of religious development is the growth of (religious) 
self-consciousness, which is not to be equated with a plea for a purely spiritual 
religion. Religion was located by Tiele primarily in the inwardness of human beings, 
in the inner relationship between man and God which is the main topic of the second 
series of the Gifford Lectures, where ‘we shall . . . endeavour to form an idea, not 
merely of the development of, but of the essential and permanent elements in religion, 





On various occasions Tiele noted that without the concepts of development and the 
laws of development there would be no science of religion in the proper sense of the 
word. In his paper for The World’s Parliament of Religions (Chicago, 1893), he 
proclaimed:  
 
What should be done first of all is to trace religion in the course of its 
development, that is to say, in its life, to inquire what every family of 
religions, as for instance the Aryan and the Semitic, what every particular 
religion, what the great religious persons have contributed to this 
development, to what laws and conditions this development is subjected and in 
what it really consists.97  
 
This objective is to be achieved in the morphological part of Tiele’s work, as 
exemplified by the first series of the Gifford Lectures. The assumptions involved in 
this programme were mentioned by Tiele himself: the idea of the unity of the human 
                                                
94
 Ibid., p. 298. 
95
 Ibid., p. 299f.  
96
 Ibid., p. 302. 
97
 Tiele, ‘On the Study of Comparative Theology’, in John Henry Barrows, ed., The World's 
Parliament of Religions, 2 vols, London 1893, vol. I, pp. 583-590, at p. 589. 
 23 
and the human species, the idea of continuity and progress, and the comparative 
method which brings non-simultaneous phenomena into line.98 
 History and comparison go hand in hand: ‘[L]ike every genuine scientific 
study, historical investigations, if they are to bear fruit, must be comparative’. Thus, 
we may determine the similarities and the differences between religious phenomena 
and religions as such.99 The introduction of the comparative method into the history of 
religions is one way to explain the fact that these early practitioners saw the study of 
religion as a ‘science’, based on induction and sound reasoning. Here we should note 
that Tiele himself was attacked for his allegedly speculative way of construing a 
developmental history of religion. It is not the genealogy of religions, which traced 
actual dependencies, but the morphology, which met criticism. Tiele’s ultimate goal 
was to outline the development of religion in mankind: ‘the progress of the religious 
man, or of mankind as religious by nature’.100 In the various religious manifestations, 
he looked for an ever-increasing – one could almost say – purification of religion, 
which gets ever more interiorized, spiritual and ethical. At the same time he also 
detected a movement which synthesizes the two main directions in religious history, 
the ‘theanthropic’ and the ‘theocratic’. The former is dominant in Aryan religions and 
conceives of the deity as immanent in man; the latter is dominant in Semitic religions 
and sees god as a ruler outside man.101 The two elements are brought together as 
follows:  
 
In adoration are united those two phases of religion which are termed by the 
schools ‘transcendent’ and ‘immanent’ respectively, or which, in religious 
language, represent the believer as ‘looking up to God as the Most High’, and as 
‘feeling himself akin to God as his Father’.102 
 
 The core of the critique concerned the combination of history and classification. 
History is about real developments, his opponents objected, whereas Tiele’s morphology 
classifies different types of religion and ‘presents’ this classification as a developmental 
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history. In the preface of the Outlines of the History of Religion, Tiele thanked his ‘friend 
and colleague Dr H. Kern, who knows all, or nearly all, about ancient India, and who 
made such a profound study of German mythology’, for his kind review of the Dutch 
edition which had appeared a year earlier. However, Tiele did not address the criticism 
that Kern had made: that every classification will collide to some extent with 
historiography.103 Even Tiele’s close colleagues had difficulties with this type of 
‘history’, as he was well aware:  
 
My old friend and colleague, the late Professor Acquoy, an authority of the 
highest rank among the historians of Christianity, could not speak without a 
smile of what he called, with a kind of ironical respect, the higher kinds of 
historical writing, and particularly of what he termed nomological hierography. 
No serious historian need trouble himself with the question whether there is a 
law in accordance to which history grows. ‘Let the philosopher study this 
question if he pleases’. Well, we do please to examine the question . . .104  
 
Tiele was not thrown off balance by such remarks, and proceeded along his own path. 
 P.D. Chantepie de la Saussaye was also rather sceptical about Tiele’s laws of 
religious development. In his obituary, he cited the above-mentioned Acquoy, who 
had written in his manual of church history that no historical law had been discovered 
so far, and that such laws probably lie outside the scope of the human mind, in which 
case it was improbable that any human being will ever discover them.105 The irony is 
evident. In the introduction to the first edition of his famous handbook, Chantepie de 
la Saussaye pointed to the complexities surrounding the concept of religious 
development, and in the second edition he dropped the idea of a developmental 
history of religion (in the singular) altogether.106 W.B. Kristensen (1867-1953) was 
critical of evolutionism,107 as was his pupil Gerardus van der Leeuw. In his 
contribution on this topic to the second edition of the German authoritative 
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encyclopaedia Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Van der Leeuw rejected 
the idea of religious progress because it did not comply with the unique and absolute 
character of religious experience.108 Phenomenology of religion, as it slowly emerged 
on Dutch soil at the beginning of the twentieth century and culminated in Van der 
Leeuw’s Phänomenologie der Religion (1933), had great difficulties with the idea of 
progressive religious development, and the idea slowly faded away in Dutch studies 
of the science of religion, as it did in cultural anthropology.109 Contrary to Eric 
Sharpe’s suggestion, evolutionism was not dominant in Dutch religious studies 
throughout the years between the wars.110 
 After the paradigm of development was abandoned it was hard to see how it 
could have been so influential. As Evans-Pritchard said in his 1950 Marett Lecture: ‘It 
will readily be seen how a combination of the notion of scientific law and that of 
progress leads in anthropology, as in the philosophy of history, to procrustean stages, 
the presumed inevitability of which gives them a normative character’.111 
Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the idea of development had been the basis of a 
major current in cultural research. It functioned as a paradigm, as is evident from the 
fact that Tiele stuck to it (almost unreflectively) in the face of strong criticism from 
colleagues, who insisted on doing ‘real history’. It was evident to him that the only 
way to relate all the different religions to each other was to place them in a scheme of 
development. Otherwise there would be no science of religion but only history of 
religions. To simply create a classification with Christianity at the top would be 
unscientific and unhistorical. From Tiele’s point of view, the various types of religion 
arise in history and develop (seen from a morphological point of view) out of each 
other, and thus, the variations can be understood in a historical way. Therefore, 
classification and history are not incompatible but are inextricably bound up with each 
other. 
 Ultimately it is Tiele’s concept of history which makes it hard for present-day 
scholars to understand him. The problem is not so much the notion of the 
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Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen or ‘the idea that in the absence of historical 
evidence, the earlier phases could be reconstructed by using data derived from the 
observation of peoples still living in earlier “stages” of development’,112 but the 
teleological view of history. Walter Benjamin tells the famous story of the angel of 
history who would have liked to stay and mourn the losses but is driven into the future 
by a storm coming from Paradise. As he turns his back to the future, the angel sees 
‘eine einzige Katastrophe, die unablässig Trümmer auf Trümmer häuft’. This storm, 
which we call progress, leaves behind a pile of debris mounting to the sky.113 Tiele’s 
‘observant spectator’, however, saw something completely different: beneath change 
and kaleidoscopic variety he detected constant progress: 
 
Human society and culture, as a whole, do not only assume new forms, but are 
continually growing; and these new forms are on the whole richer, ampler, 





This essay explores C.P. Tiele’s fundamental notion of religious development and, in 
a certain respect, it complements my earlier paper on his concept of religion, which he 
ultimately locates ‘in the innermost depths of our souls’ (Numen 46/1999). The 
present article argues that the mere possibility of an interrelated, comparative study of 
religions (in the plural) is founded on the idea of a developmental history of religion 
(in the singular). To Tiele, this history testifies to the fact that the changing and 
transient forms of religion are ultimately inadequate expressions of the infinite in us. 
Thus, his ‘science’ ties in perfectly with his liberal Protestantism. I start with some 
remarks on the use of the concept of religious development in the nineteenth century, 
then I outline Tiele’s basic assumptions (with special reference to his 1874 article on 
the laws of development), and, finally, I scrutinize the first series of the Gifford 
Lectures (1896-1898), which epitomize his later views on religious development. It is 
shown that developmental thinking in early Dutch science of religion did not originate 
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primarily in Darwinian thought but in German idealism. Moreover, one has to keep in 
mind that Tiele’s developmental views met severe criticism among his successors. For 
instance, Gerardus van der Leeuw rejected the whole idea of religious progress 
because it did not comply with the unique and absolute character of religious 
experience. Thus, contrary to Eric Sharpe’s suggestion, evolutionism was not 
dominant in Dutch religious studies throughout the period between the wars. 
 
 
